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CoRPORATIONs-D1ssoLUTION-EQUITY PoWER To D1ssoLVE GoING CON-
CERN FOR DISSENSION-The stock in a hotel management corporation was 
divided equally between two families, each of which had for some 
years been unable to agree or cooperate with the other in the management 
of the business. As a result of this dissension, no meeting of stockholders 
or directors was held for some years, no withdrawals of profits had been 
possible for six years, and the corporation had been operated at a loss 
for the year prior to suit. While the concern was not insolvent, such a 
financial state was allegedly imminent, the business of the corporation 
was admittedly poorly managed and its property was in need of repair. 
In view of these facts the owners of one half the stock brought an action 
for dissolution of the corporation in equity. From an order granting 
dissolution and dismissing a cross-bill for specific performance of an 
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option to buy plaintiff's stock, defendants appealed. Held, affirmed.1 
Neither a showing of insolvency nor statutory authorization is necessary 
for equity to act when dissension is accompanied by "financial loss, corpor-
ate paralysis, mismanagement and deterioration of property." Levant v. 
Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W. (2d) 336 (1957). 
It is still the tendency for courts to speak, as did the court in the 
principal case,2 of a general rule that equity, absent statute, has no 
power to dissolve or wind up8 the affairs of a solvent going corporation at 
the suit of a stockholder. This doctrine, which has its basis in the notion 
µtat only the legislature could traditionally determine life or death for 
the corporation,4 has in the past century been so engrafted with exceptions 
and limitations that its validity may be doubted today.11 Michigan is one 
of the few large commercial states in which legislation has not been enacted 
to grant equity courts statutory dissolution power in cases of deadlock.8 
The state was also one of the first, however, to recognize the inherent 
ability of equity, in "exceptional" circumstances, to dissolve corporations.7 
The significance of the principal case, then, is found not so much in its 
assumption of the dissolution power as in its declaration of the ground 
upon which it recognizes equity dissolution as proper.-While fraud, gross 
mismanagement, non-user, and failure of corporate purpose have frequently 
1 The court's affirmance also went to the issue presented by defendant's cross-bill 
concerning the existence of a "first option" restriction upon plaintiff's power to transfer 
shares. Defendants' claim that the request for dissolution brought the option into 
operation was rejected by the court on the ground that the option agreement contemplated 
only a transfer of capital stock. The court held that plaintiff's request was one for sale 
of assets, not capital stock. This holding accords with the generally accepted principle 
that such options are to be narrowly construed. Dobry v. Dobry, (Okla. 1953) 262 P. 
(2d) 691. See generally O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held 
Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. ,REv. 773 (1952). It is submitted, 
however, that an option drafted to cover this eventuality and containing a fair valuation 
formula might produce the most desirable result, enabling the party desiring to terminate 
his investment to do so and obtain a fair return while allowing the other party, if he 
q.esires, to continue -the -business without interruption. 
2 Principal case at 242. 
3 A distinction is frequently drawn by courts between dissolution and winding up. 
Dissolution is generally thought to go beyond the mere disposition of assets, which 
constitutes a winding up, and includes a termination of the corporate franchise. See, e.g., 
Schneider v. Schneider, 347 Mo. 102 at 109, 146 S.W. (2d) 584 (1941). 
4 Corporations were originally created by special legislative charter and it was thus 
reasonable to hold that since the state "gave," only the state could "take away." Today 
the almost exclusive use of general incorporation statutes has rendered such reasoning 
less tenable. See Goodwin v. Von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351, 177 N.W. 618 (1920). 
5 That the equity courts have inherent power to dissolve is the majority rule, see 
Hornstein, "A Remedy for Corporate Abuse," 40 CoL. L. REv. 220 (1940). But see COOK, 
CORPORATIONS, 8th ed., §629 (1923); 16 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. §§8080, 8098 (1942) to the 
contrary. 
6 For examples of the broad statutory authority granted the courts in cases of 
intracorporate dissension and deadlock, see, e.g., 22 N.'Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943; 
Supp. 1957) §103; Ohio Rev. Code (Page, 1954; Supp. 1957) §1701.91. 
7 Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892). 
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been successfully invoked as bases for equity dissolution,8 intracorporate 
dissension apart from statute has never appeared as either the sole or 
principal9 justification for decision. This is so perhaps because dissension 
in the large publicly-held corporation seldom prevents the successful 
conduct of corporate affairs by the board of directors. Deadlocks are rare, 
and the dissenting minority has the alternative of buying sufficient shares 
to gain control, or of selling out. In such a setting, the potential adverse 
effects of dissension are minimal, and it is recognized that mere differences 
of opinion do not constitute grounds for dissolution.10 However, in the 
case of the closely held "family" corporation, where the stock is evenly 
divided, dissension frequently means ruinous deadlock. The remedies of 
the dissenter to buy further or sell out are not so easily accomplished. 
Thus as in the case of a partnership, to which some writers have analogized 
this situation,11 equity dissolution may become a useful and desirable 
judicial tool if wielded with care. When a deadlock occurs it would 
normally seem to be in the interest of the stockholders, the creditors and 
the state to dissolve the corporation for, as indicated in the principal 
case,12 in this area dissension rarely exists alone. It is most often accom-
panied by fraudulent exclusion, corporate paralysis, mismanagement, or 
substantial deterioration of property. While thus reiterating that dissension 
alone is not a sufficient allegation for dissolution the court perhaps 
establishes a "dissension, plus . . ." test for Michigan.13 The imprecise 
nature of such a test is not to be criticized. Equity dissolution should not 
be made a weapon of power for the whimsical dissenter, nor should it 
be invoked and applied inflexibly, since the factual variations that may 
accompany dissension are many. It would seem these cases are best decided 
empirically, since dissolution may often work serious detriment to one 
faction, rather than merely terminating the existence of an entity doomed 
to eventual failure. 
Robert P. Luciano, S.Ed. 
Robert M. Vorsanger 
s See cases cited in 16 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP. §§8081 et seq. (1942). 
o Cases in which equity power was used to dissolve a corporation on the ground 
of dissension and deadlock are collected in 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1260 at 1263 (1950). In none 
of these cases did it appear that dissension was the sole basis for dissolution; rather the 
dissension in each was accompanied by deadlock, mismanagement, exclusion of the 
opposing group, or financial reverses. 
10 See 16 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP. §§7712, 8082 (1942). 
11 See, e.g., 47 MICH. L. REv. 684 (1949). See generally, Israels, "Sacred Cow of 
Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution," 19 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 778 
(1952). 
12 Principal case at 244. 
13 Such a test seems equally valid as a summarization of the decisions in other 
jurisdictions on the same subject. See note 8 supra. It is also consistent with the more 
general observation that while one detrimental factor standing alone will be considered 
insufficient grounds for equity dissolution, a combination of factors will satisfy the court 
.that dissolution is warranted. See In re Brinsmead &: Sons, [1897] 1 Ch. 45. 
